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Tuesday, September 30, 2008

List of East Asian Countires

Following are the East Asian countries which India seeks to establish bi-lateral relations.
- Brunei
- Burma
- Cambodia
- China
- Fiji
- Indonesia
- Japan
- Kiribati
- Korea, North
- Korea, South
- Laos
- Malaysia
- Marshall Islands
- Micronesia
- Mongolia
- Nauru
- New Zealand
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Philippines
- Samoa
- Singapore
- Solomon Islands
- Taiwan
- Thailand
- Timor-Leste
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu
- Vietnam

Monday, September 29, 2008

The Road to Mandalay

By G Parthasarthy
Courtesy: Rediff.Com

External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh will be leaving shortly for Myanmar to inaugurate the 144 km road that engineers of our Border Roads Organisation have built, linking the township of Tamu with the railhead at Kalemyo in Myanmar. This road is essentially designed to provide Indian goods market access to important centres in Myanmar like Mandalay.

One hopes the minister will undertake a part of his journey by road travelling across the national highway from Imphal to the border town of Moreh, located barely two kilometres from Tamu. He will find the visit revealing. Provided the authorities don't intervene and ask traders not to display foreign goods, Jaswant Singh will find the markets in Moreh and other border towns well stocked with goods from Myanmar, China and Thailand. If he should visit any small township across the border in Myanmar he will find the shops there well stocked with Indian bicycles, consumer goods, pharmaceuticals and even electrical generators.

If Jaswant Singh's officials search the trade statistics prepared by the Mandarins of Udyog Bhavan they will find that none of these trade exchanges are reflected in official statistics. Those dealing with enforcement will label all these border trade exchanges as 'smuggling'. But, for the people of the North Eastern states the exchanges of goods across borders artificially drawn up by the British merely reflect a continuation of their historical links with countries like Myanmar, Laos, Thailand and China.

We often tend to forget the fact that through the centuries there has been a natural exchange of peoples, goods and services between our North East and the countries of South and South East Asia. The Ahoms of Assam after all migrated several centuries ago from the Shan State of Myanmar, where the language spoken is almost identical to that spoken in Laos and Thailand. The Chins from Myanmar have migrated over the past centuries to Manipur and Mizoram and the Maities of Manipur have ties for over 2000 years with the Burmans of Myanmar. There has been a similar migration to the North East from the Yunan Province of China. The ties between what is now Bangladesh and its neighbours like Assam and West Bengal are also so close that there is little that governments can do to prevent the free movement of goods and services across national boundaries. Likewise, there are now nearly half a million people of Indian origin living in Myanmar who retain close cultural, emotional and spiritual ties with India.

Just over two years ago Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand came together to form an economic association called BIMSTEC linking the littoral states of the Bay of Bengal. This economic grouping aims to promote rapid economic cooperation between members in key areas like trade, investment, tourism, fisheries, agriculture, transportation links and human resources development. India and Sri Lanka have already concluded a bilateral Free Trade Agreement that is showing the potential to rapidly expand bilateral trade and economic cooperation.

As members of ASEAN, Myanmar and Thailand will be moving towards developing free trade ties. It is, therefore, important that India should move ahead in concluding free trade agreements with Bangladesh and Myanmar as soon as possible. The way should be paved for BIMSTEC to move towards becoming a Free Trade Association. One effective way to deal with insurgency in the North East would be to cooperate with Myanmar in the development of forestry and agricultural resources in Myanmar's Sagaing division and Chin state that border Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland. The immense hydroelectric potential of the areas bordering India could be developed to promote rapid economic growth of the North East.

China and Myanmar are now not only opening out their economies to foreign investment, but also endeavouring to become major tourism destinations. While India attracts barely 2.5 million tourists annually, an estimated 72 million tourists visited China in 1999. Beijing alone has 65,000 hotel rooms, almost the same number as the whole of India. Our capital city has only 8,000 hotel rooms. Thus, while there was much being spoken in India about China posing a strategic challenge to us, the fact of the matter is that unless we set our house in order and shed some of our policies regarded as sacred cows like reservations for the small scale-sector and treating tourism facilities as highly taxed luxury industries, we will soon find ourselves increasingly marginalised both industrially and in spheres like tourism by China and other East Asian countries.

More importantly, we will find people living in our North Eastern states raising queries about why they cannot be the beneficiaries of larger incomes through tourism, trade and transit as their neighbours to the east. The belief in New Delhi that problems like public disaffection, unemployment and insurgency can be overcome merely by pouring in financial resources into border states whether it is Jammu & Kashmir or Assam, needs to be reviewed. A greater emphasis has to be placed on these states raising their own resources and enhancing productive employment by encouraging, tourism, trade, transit and foreign investment.

There has naturally been concern that the opening out of border trade in the North East would lead to the region's own industries being adversely affected by a flood of Chinese goods. With China set to join the WTO it would have to make its trade and pricing policies much more transparent than at present. It is, therefore, important that arrangements should be concluded with China so that trade across land borders is conducted on an MFN basis with an appropriate tariff structure. This arrangement could extend to the Indo-Tibetan border also, with the progressive opening out of an increasing number of border check posts to promote trade. There have been some recent discussions on how to promote such cooperation with China regionally in a Track II Process, popularly known as the Kunming initiative.

The road we are presently constructing in Myanmar will have little utility in promoting our interests if we continue to follow our presently restrictive and unrealistic border trade practices. It is ludicrous to expect traders living in our North Eastern states to observe cumbersome procedures and banking arrangements in their trade with counterparts across the border. Procedures need to be simplified so that traders in the North Eastern states can exchange goods on barter and through counter trade arrangements.

There is need for introducing a number of trade facilitation measures to promote border trade with Myanmar and Bangladesh, including transportation systems that allow cross-border movements of vehicles and the provision of auxiliaries like weight bridges and cold storage. It makes economic sense to evolve measures for Myanmar to provide the requirements of agricultural commodities like rice and dals to our North East under counter trade arrangements, rather than pay huge subsidies for supplies from distant parts of India.

It is essentially for New Delhi to ensure that such arrangements are expeditiously put in place. The North-Eastern states will then become centres of transit for trade with our eastern neighbours. All this only increases the urgency for concluding free trade agreements with our eastern neighbours.

Given the high levels of literacy and prevalent use of English in some of our North Eastern states like Mizoram, the IT industry must be persuaded to move into software parks in the region. These parks will serve to attract business and trainees from our eastern neighbours. While moves are underway to construct an international airport at Guwahati, there is need to look at measures to promote foreign investment to attract tourists from ASEAN and East Asian countries including the Yunan Province of China to the North Eastern states. The land routes in Myanmar, bordering Manipur and Mizoram should be opened for travel, pilgrimages and tourism.

While much has been spoken over the past decade about a new momentum being imparted to our 'Look East' policies, these policies will serve our national interest best only if they are integrally linked to the promotion of the economic progress and welfare of the people of our North Eastern states

Look East Policy: Impact on Northeast India

Charles Reuben Lyngdoh (ed.) Merostar Rani (ed.)

Hardcover, xii+162p., Tables
Pub. Date: Feb 2008 , 1st ed.
Publisher: Akansha Publishing House
Language: English





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India’s Look East Policy: Issues Ignored

By Vibhanshu Shekhar
Research Fellow, IPCS
August 10, 2007

Since 2005, the geographical canvas of India's Look East Policy (LEP) has expanded considerably, with the formation of East Asia Summit and India's increasing involvement in the East Asian Community, bringing into its ambit new players and diverse priorities.

Similarly, India's engagement with the ASEAN region, the central focus of the LEP, has become much more varied and intense, whether it is in the realm of political, economic or security cooperation.

While the expansion of the focus and multiplication of responsibilities have been hailed as the success of India's LEP, they also bring into focus the level of India's preparedness in engaging on such a wide scale in a nuanced manner, and the methods and strategies being pursued.

The last point brings up an important question facing the LEP. While the geographical focus of the LEP has increased manifold, its existing format caters only to the needs of ASEAN. Does the LEP have an appropriate policy framework or the requisite mechanisms to address the emerging complexity of engagement, as the frames of reference expand and given the strategic importance of these players in Asia?

On the one hand, India's engagement with the northeast Asia has been either bilateral or based on an ASEAN-centric framework, while the rules of engagement as outlined under the East Asian Summit have been dominated by the ASEAN+3 framework.

In such a case will India rely only on bilateral mechanisms or try to address the need for a bigger platform to engage its new Look East members? Furthermore, though India has been able to engage China and Japan bilaterally on issues of larger concern, it has not been able to do so in the case of South Korea.

One of the largest investors in Myanmar and the Mekong region and a member of OECD, South Korea is also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and a reluctant Korea will not help Indian case in the NSG. Another related issue is how ASEAN members perceive India's growing strategic presence in the region. India has not been able to engage effectively with some of the key ASEAN members.

Despite being the coordinating country for the India-ASEAN FTA, home to the largest number of Indian Diaspora in Southeast Asia, and India's second largest ASEAN trading partner, Malaysia has remained out of the central focus of LEP.

Given Malaysia's preference for an Islamic outlook in its foreign policy, there is a need to approach Malaysia as the second largest Muslim democracy in the world. Such an approach can help in removing the misgivings between the two countries, facilitate greater people-to-people contact between the two countries and also connect the Indian Diaspora with the mainstream host society and economy.

The Philippines, another important ASEAN player, also seems to have slipped off the radar of India's LEP. The forthcoming visit of the Philippine President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, to India will show how seriously India is engaging this country. Another important issue, which needs immediate attention, is the issue of Myanmar.

During the last five years, India's Myanmar policy seems to have revolved around three important issues - engaging the military junta and arresting its drift towards China, securing energy, especially natural gas, and connecting to mainland Southeast Asia. India, however, seems to have failed in achieving any of these objectives.

Today, China is more effective, even in persuading the military junta to move towards democratic transition and in preventing human rights violations. Despite doing all the exploration work, India lost to China when it came to receiving the supply of natural gas from the A1 and A3 blocks of Arakan gas-field. India's infrastructural projects connecting northeast with Myanmar and other Mekong countries suffer from time-lag, incomplete projects and lack of resources.

Furthermore, despite Singapore Foreign Minister, George Yeo's call in July 2007, for a greater Indian role in Myanmar, India has not been able to develop a coherent approach to address the challenge of Myanmar.

There is a great urgency for India's LEP to recover from the slipups and to address the gap between the intent of a regional player and its actions on the ground, in order to make its engagement with ASEAN much more meaningful. The sooner this is done, the better.

India's 'Look East' Policy Pays off

By Sultan Shahin
Source: Asia Times
October 11, 2003

Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's Southeast Asian tour this week to participate in the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) summit in Bali, Indonesia marks the success of a decade-long shift in Indian foreign policy - known as the "Look East" strategy - initiated by former prime minister Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s. The political consensus that had then emerged, partly as a response to the end of Cold War, to liberalize the economy and participate in the new trend of globalization, is apparently continuing to win India new business partners and friends in its continuing war against militancy in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Two broad agreements, for comprehensive economic cooperation and combating terrorism, have been signed. India has also consented to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Vajpayee went a step further to offer a unilateral "open skies" policy to specified Southeast Asian airlines, which will be free to operate daily flights to the Indian metropolitan centers, outside any bilateral aviation pact. Laying stress on better connectivity between India and ASEAN, Vajpayee said, "We could see how close we can get with an open skies arrangement." In this context he announced India's unilateral decision to connect all 10 ASEAN capitals with four metropolises in India through daily flights without further bilateral discussions.

Apart from laying emphasis on the need for road links between the geographically contiguous India and ASEAN countries, Vajpayee also suggested the holding of an India-ASEAN motor rally. The framework agreement spells out a program for free trade agreements in goods, services, investment, areas of economic cooperation and an early harvest program. Negotiations on free trade agreements in goods will take due account of the economic sensitivities of the less developed economies of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and the Philippines.

And on Thursday, India and Thailand signed five agreements covering a wide range of issues, including a landmark free trade agreement following a one-to-one meeting between Vajpayee and Thai premier Thaksin Shinawatra in Bangkok. The agreement will allow for free trade on all goods by 2010. The two countries will also slash tariffs by 50 percent on 84 products under an early harvest scheme to go into effect March 1 of next year. In addition, ways to combat terrorism and intelligence sharing were also discussed, with India offering to sell defense equipment to Thailand.

Taken together, these steps promise considerable improvement in economic and political cooperation between India and its Southeast Asian neighbors - extending from Myanmar to the Philippines. India is glad to have been present, thanks to its ASEAN associate membership, when the members agreed to create the eastern equivalent of the European Union in two decades. The Bali Concord II envisions a single Southeast Asian market, covering 500 million people and with annual trade that already touches US$720 billion. The concord calls for the creation of an ASEAN Economic Community modeled on the EU by 2020. If ASEAN evolves a free trade arrangement with China on similar terms - the abolition of all tariffs and trade barriers - the result will be the world's largest free trade zone.

India has already been able to take a small step towards taking advantage of this historic development. The early harvest program New Delhi has signed with ASEAN lays out a timetable for mutual trade concessions up to 2007. Skeptical Indian observers are hoping that it will lead to an across-the-board lowering of trade barriers, despite India's traditional reluctance in giving such concessions, and that the story of so-called free trade agreements with Sri Lanka and Singapore will not be repeated. In the case of Sri Lanka, India placed curbs on tea, textiles and rubber - the very items Sri Lanka could sell in the Indian market. As for Singapore, more than two years after agreeing to work out a free trade treaty, it has just been announced that the city-state will only now "study" the issue.

The slow pace of economic reforms and lack of better integration of its foreign and trade policies has made many analysts skeptical whether India will be able to effectively sustain its "Look East" policy, despite all the hype associated with the prime minister's annual trips to the region. External Affairs minister Yashwant Sinha is, however, adamant that India has embarked on the second phase of its "Look East" strategy. In a speech at Harvard University last month, Sinha pointed to a remarkable transformation in India's attitude towards Asia: "In the past, India's engagement with much of Asia, including Southeast and East Asia, was built on an idealistic conception of Asian brotherhood, based on shared experiences of colonialism and of cultural ties. The rhythm of the region today is determined, however, as much by trade, investment and production as by history and culture. That is what motivates our decade-old 'Look East' policy. Already, this region accounts for 45 percent of our external trade."

Vajpayee's address at the ASEAN business summit struck the right chord by focusing on the country's areas of strengths and inviting ASEAN investors to take a fresh look at "India of the 21st Century ... [a] country on the move." He has set an ambitious target for India-ASEAN trade: it is to grow from $12.5 billion now to $30 billion in 2007. Addressing the meet on Tuesday, Vajpayee, seeking to partner ASEAN in the era of globalization, listed six strong points of the Indian economy, including a rich pool of English-speaking people, as well as the information technology revolution for enhancing India-ASEAN trade and investment.

The prime minister said, "India is conscious of the new ASEAN members. We are offering unilateral tariff concessions on items of export interest to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam [lesser developed and newer entrants to ASEAN]. We are also seeking to incorporate an early harvest scheme to provide the incentive for a long-term engagement. If we proceed along this course, we can target a trade turnover of US$30 billion by 2007 and a free trade area within 10 years." Observing that India's trade and economic interaction with the ASEAN countries has been growing steadily, but not fast enough, Vajpayee said trade of less than $10 billion between the two did not do justice to the combined population of 1.5 billion people, producing $1.5 trillion worth of goods and services annually. Recalling his speech at the first India-ASEAN business summit a year ago for boosting business, he said, "Our trade has since grown by about 25 percent, but my comments remain valid."

The business summit was also addressed by Chinese and Japanese Prime Ministers Wen Jiabao and Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun. The powerful ASEAN comprises Indonesia, its current chairman, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar and Brunei. Vajpayee said in spite of the recent stalemate at the Cancun World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, a rule-based and fair multilateral trading system should remain the goal. "But while we search for this ideal, regional trading arrangements offer immediate advantages, particularly for geographical contiguous regions. They can provide our domestic industry and agriculture with a valuable learning period, before being exposed to the far greater competition of global free trade," he said.

Observing that non-Asians viewed Asia as the principal market of the future, the prime minister said it would emerge as a manufacturing hub and a global provider of services. "Asian countries should work towards strengthening their mutual synergies, so that they are strategically placed to derive maximum benefit from the emerging opportunities. The India-ASEAN partnership should energize this process to move us closer to our shared goal of making this truly the Asian century," Vajpayee said.

Of special significance for India was the agreement to fight terrorism cooperatively. It has been facilitated by the fact that several ASEAN countries are facing the threat of terrorism. The Philippines, Indonesia and even Singapore have felt the impact of international terrorism. The Jemmah Islamiyah outfit is active in Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia. Indonesia in the past year has witnessed two major terror attacks in Bali and Jakarta. The ASEAN countries have, therefore, become serious about dealing with terrorism and related crimes like money laundering and drug trafficking. They are looking to India for support to meet the challenges on this front. The ASEAN Regional Forum will remain the platform for a security dialogue in the region and it includes the US and the European Union. The declaration adopted at Bali provides for cooperation on information exchange, legal matters, and enforcement matters apart from institution building and training.

Speaking on the subject in an address to the Institute of Diplomatic and Foreign Relations in Kuala Lumpur on May 16, 2001, Vajpayee had articulated his vision of a new Southeast Asian security structure and India's role in it. "We are conscious of the striving for a new security structure in the world, moving away from obsolete Cold War constructs," said Vajpayee. "We are engaged in a process of dialogue and consultation with our friends and partners to help shape a new security environment free of confrontation and tension. Our security dialogue with ASEAN can also include this theme. The nature of the global village has made it necessary to tackle even non-military issues of security in a comprehensive manner. Our region lies along side sea lanes of great strategic importance, which need to be protected. Poverty and shortages of food and energy threaten the stability of societies. Population growth and the spread of diseases like AIDS and TB are factors of deep concern. Environmental degradation and cyber crime are relatively newer concerns.

"There can be no effective solution to these problems within national boundaries. They have to be tackled through a cooperative approach, holistically and regionally. The security dialogue between India and ASEAN is, therefore, of utmost importance. Threats like religious extremism, drug trafficking, money laundering and terrorism have cast a dark shadow over our region. India has been a victim of state-sponsored and cross-border terrorism seeking to redraw national boundaries. Such violence in the name of holy war is a grave menace especially to pluralistic societies and endangers a peaceful and civilized global order."

India's growing relations with the countries belonging to ASEAN and the BIMSTEC forum comprising Bangladesh, India, Myanmar Sri Lanka and Thailand is beginning to free it from the straitjacket imposed by the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The latter is now largely moribund due to a standoff between India and Pakistan.

Incidentally, India is not alone in its desire to run away from South Asia. While India has been looking east in its desire to get away from its geographical location, Pakistan has been looking west since even before India initiated its "Look East" policy. It has also been seeking to enter into ASEAN. While Indian efforts appear to be meeting with success, however, the same cannot be said about Pakistan. India-Pakistan animosity has created irritations for ASEAN as well. But its spill-over effects in India-ASEAN relations have been contained. Though some of Pakistan's friends in ASEAN have been trying to upgrade its status, perhaps in the name of Muslim solidarity, India and its friends have managed to keep it out. ASEAN is obviously trying to avoid becoming another arena for the two South Asian neighbors obsessed with each other to vent their hostility, make wild accusations and create ever-new controversies.

It seems that at last India's "Look East" policy has started paying dividends. ASEAN and India appear to have developed a clearer vision of the future of their relationship. They have set realistic targets for development of trade and investment at the Bali summit. Southeast Asian leaders have also identified areas of cooperation and collaboration on global issues, including those related to the and the future of the United Nations. ASEAN has also been trying to balance its trade and overall ties between its two giant neighbors - China and India.

Things have been moving forward for India since 1997, when it began its formal interaction with ASEAN as a full dialogue partner. It is up to New Delhi to maintain the momentum this relationship has been developing. ASEAN will naturally look for concrete follow-up measures on the agreements signed. The negotiations for a free trade agreement will begin in January 2004, on goods, and take up services in 2005 so that the whole framework is in place by 2007. India is committed to lowering its peak tariffs to East Asian levels by 2005. India cannot afford to be niggardly about tariff concessions, if it doesn't want the new ASEAN to automatically gravitate towards China. Meeting goals being set now will be the test of the relationship and its measure of success. Taking stock of the substantive agenda spelt out at the first India-ASEAN summit in Cambodia last November, Vajpayee admitted that there have been doubts about the pace of implementation of certain proposals, but in his view progress has nevertheless been much more rapid than anticipated. As a mark of this forward movement, the India-ASEAN Vision 2020 would be adopted at the third summit in Laos next year.

Vajpayee has spoken of his vision of a future where ASEAN countries and India would stand together as a single economic community. The implementation of this idea, he said, would depend on the comfort level of member countries. But if this vision is to be realized, India will have to be more pro-active than it has been so far. Experts believe that a united ASEAN will be both an export market and an economic rival to India. India has no reason to drag its heels on trade agreements as is its wont. It normally keeps looking for strategic incentives to make up its mind. According to one expert it should be incentive enough for India that ASEAN plus China will be Asia's largest economic zone and Asia's fulcrum for decades.

Not everybody in India is, however, enthused by Vajpayee and Sinha's exertions in bringing India close to ASEAN, or their rhetoric about making the 21st an Asian century. In a scathing editorial view, India's largest circulated newspaper, The Times of India, wrote on Wednesday: "New Delhi's record in any regional or international arrangement is dismal, and driven by its obsession with Pakistan. As the big boy in the South Asian bloc, India could have played a key role. Instead it has held SAARC hostage to its problems with Pakistan. In the Commonwealth, too, New Delhi's sole concern is how to target Pakistan by isolating it from the international community. Again, at the recent UN General Assembly session, New Delhi's exertions were solely with reference to Pakistan.

"While no one would deny that Pakistan is waging a proxy war against India through terrorism, to be a prisoner of this in diplomacy makes New Delhi seem as if it has no other item on its agenda. This time, too, terrorism is high on the prime minister's agenda. And, even as he was setting out for Bali, Mr Vajpayee could not restrain himself from speaking, at some length, of Pakistan's terrorist training camps. Unless Indian diplomacy can extricate itself from this trap, it is unlikely to succeed in its pursuit of a larger, global vision."

But, paradoxically, Indian foreign policy successes are gaining a growing number of admirers in Pakistan. Shireen M Mazari, a respected strategic affairs analyst and director general, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, commented in a recent writeup in The News: "Pakistan should be prepared to see India pushing its way into the Organization of Islamic Countries. Already, India is expanding its influence in the Gulf and has become a full dialogue partner in the Gulf Cooperation Council, alongside the US and Japan. And India is already active in Afghanistan, Central Asia and increasingly in Iran also. In Southeast Asia, India is increasing its interaction with ASEAN while ensuring that Pakistan is kept out.

"Indian pro-activism is in sharp contrast to Pakistan, which continues to focus almost solely on the US. Opportunities in the neighborhood go unnoticed or ignored as we look to keep the US appeased even as its officials launch into diatribes against Pakistan - retracting some of them much later when the damage has already been done, or when they finally feel that Pakistan has had enough and will not tolerate more abuse. Even at the micro level, individual Pakistanis continue to be harassed and abused by US officials, with no reciprocity in such treatment being meted out to Americans visiting Pakistan."

Clearly, Vajpayee will feel as much at home in Islamabad as he did in Bali when, or perhaps one should still say if, he goes to Islamabad next January to attend a SAARC summit conference. His pro-active and successful foreign policy has no dearth of admirers in the enemy camp. The momentum built up at the ASEAN summit will, however, have to be kept up for a real transformation of Indian relationship with its Southeast Asian neighbors.

Look East Policy: Perspectives from Politico-economic and Military Lenses

By Eric Koo Peng
Master of Science in Strategic Studies from the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies.
Courtesy: Whatisindia.Com

With the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, and with the onset of globalization, nations are beginning to realize that the means to making wealth is by the securing of international trade and encouragement of foreign investments. Free market rules following the proven philosophy of mass capitalization dominate the international political scene over governing ideology. The 1990s was a period seeing rapid economic development and growth of Asian countries, especially in South East Asia. South East Asia is a region with vast economic potential.

And India, a vast sub-continent in South Asia, is a fast emerging economic and political force to be reckoned with. Thus it is, that the Indian leadership came up with a concept of ideas called the “Look East Policy” of India, an active economic policy of engagement with South East Asia to be implemented as an official initiative in achieving two objectives, the encouragement of trade links with individual partners and to provide foreign employment for India’s own expanding work force.

India has an improved interest in South East Asia (SEA). The economy of South East Asia is a virtually untapped market which is up for grabs by major regional economic entities such as India, China, Europe or the USA.

Why was there a shift in policy towards South East Asia? Formerly, India, as a nominal ally of the Soviet Union, became isolated from Asian mainstream affairs. The military-strategic alliance of Pakistan and China also served as a repressive policy against India’s national and economic interests, limiting its options in seeking trading partners in other states.

The only SEA states which had serious ties with India were from the communist bloc – Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. During the Cold War, these states were also impoverished because of years of war and social upheaval. India’s multi-lateral relations in South East Asia during the Cold War brought little benefits through serious trade links.

In the meantime, other ASEAN[1] states had gone forward from ex-colonial backwaters in the Pacific oceanic region, to becoming rapidly developing societies and eventually, towards the goal of modern, industrialized states with well developed and sophisticated economies based on the twin pillars of national prosperity – trade and industry.

India has missed the bandwagon of opportunity once during the Cold War, by placing its stakes on the wrong superpower, the Soviet Union, which collapsed abruptly and unexpectedly in 1991. As a result, India’s economic ties with South East Asia are loose and the level of inter-state trade remains relatively low in revenue, such as engaging in relatively insignificant import-export trade of local Indian consumer products regulated by demand from local Indian communities in SEA countries.

Deprived of a strong allied nation, it is imperative that India seeks new markets with which to fuel its own economic growth alongside its own burgeoning population.

India depends largely on itself on promoting its Look East Policy, having the need to compete against a great regional rival, China. Having less attractive pre-set conditions in contrast to China, India’s revenue from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), is minuscule compared with China’s FDI. An analysis of what factors make the Look East Policy important to India, the response of South East Asia towards India’s economic engagement and of what advantages it can gain as an edge over China in competing for the attention of South East Asia in economic co-operation, will be discussed in detail.

Historical background – origins of policy

From the 16th to 20th centuries, Indian migrants had voyaged across the Indian Ocean to the Malay Archipelago as labourers seeking work on the vast colonial plantations or as traders.

The origin of the “Look East” policy arose from political consciousness, focusing primarily on forging mutually beneficial ties between India with South East Asia and Japan. At the end of World War 2, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru tried to engage Asia by supporting anti-colonial struggles, advocating pan-Asianism, and a a new international order based on not choosing sides during the Cold War.[2] It can also be said that the “Look East Policy” for India is an indirect expression of wishing to return to a continuation of India’s historical behaviour.

However, India’s border defeat by China in 1962 became a setback for India’s foreign policies and was also seen as an unimpressive military and diplomatic performance record from the South East Asian perspective. Moreover, India’s pro-Soviet stand alienated it from SEA, culminating in the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, which earned India even more distrust.

India also had asymmetry of trade in Japan and bilateral relations were only at the eliminatory stage. However, until the 1990s, India was perceived unfavourably by ASEAN and Japan in general, with negative impressions of a corruption-rife government with a population yielding generally poor work ethics and sloth, resulting in low quality products and services. It is a perception which India is determined to change.

The “Look East” policy has achieved positive results with improved Indo-Japan relations, transparency measures to demonstrate non-corruption, and most importantly, India’s inclusion in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In fact, this policy becomes increasingly attractive for a variety of reasons as stated in section 3.

Developing international events also altered the strategic calculus. The break up of the Soviet Union after the Cold War made possible the improvement of US-Indo ties, thereby also leading to favourable conditions to initiate economic encroachment into South East Asia. Political stabilization of war-torn Afghanistan and Cambodia also introduced changes in the prioritizing of national interests which was incidentally, towards India’s favour. As India’s strained ties with the South East Asian were considered to be with the region as a whole, rather than with each individual country, the vanishing of Cold-War tensions in the South East Asian region also made it possible to easily identify and pursue common goals towards mutual inter-state interest.

India also accelerated its efforts in controlling the diplomatic damage done shortly after the nuclear tests in 1998, seeking to re-engage with other Asian countries. India was eventually seen as not truly posing a security threat to the Asia –Pacific region, and moreover, has the potential in developing as a serious counter balance against China’s growing influence in the region.[3]

Factors driving the policy

Pragmatism remains the central key driving India’s Look East Policy. Several factors determine India’s interest in looking at the South East Asian region.

Need to counter China economically

The open door policies of China, India’s regional neighbour, during the 1980s had seen the meteoric rise of an emerging economic giant in Asia, in contrast with India’s own Fabian socialist policies in India under Nehru’s rule.[4] China competes with India in the political, economic and military sphere and most importantly, for economic influence in the region of South East Asia. In short, India must adopt an economically aggressive stance to compete well with international market forces at work in the region.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that he welcomed Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into India, which rakes in only a current US$3 billion as compared to US$53 billion in FDI to China annually.[5] India’s FDI barely measures up to 6% of its main rival’s.

Obviously, there is a need to seek new markets in order for India to grow economically and to seek a significant way of countering China’s own economic policies.

An emerging middle class

The Americans invented the concept of outsourcing, essentially the exploitation of foreign labour with minimal amount of control, but nevertheless, governed by motivation for profit. A US software engineer earns US$75,000 per year as compared to his Indian counterpart, who earns US$20,000 per year in India. 60% of India’s one billion population is below the age of 30, meaning that a vast number of educated and talented people formed a huge manpower pool waiting to be tapped. Globalization and the Western media have also brought about influences in Western tastes and a materialistic lifestyle in a growing middle class in India. A world wealth report in June 2004 by US brokerage firm Merill Lynch, revealed that India has 61,000 millionaires, in US dollars.[6] However, the average Indian earns just US$1.60 per day. Materialism has led to a disturbing trend in mercenary pursuit of wealth at the expense of traditional, conservative social values. In a local crackdown in New Delphi, nearly 300 women from middle class background were arrested for prostitution.[7]

Thus, India seeks new markets to export its restless workforce. An ignoring of changing trends however, could well lead to serious social problems for the government of India.

Containment from West and Central Asia

India’s long dispute with Pakistan over the Jammu and Kashmir region has caused long standing hostile bilateral ties between these two states. China, as Pakistan’s ally and a potential economic rival, would sensibly pursue policies that either not promote or even hinder India’s economic progress and interests.

Although India also possesses business interests and provides foreign labour to the Middle East, geo-political instability and the constant threat of terrorism meant that there can be no serious undertaking of worthwhile financial investment in Middle Eastern countries. As a consequence, India remains hemmed in and severed from mainstream Asian affairs on either the western or northern direction. The only remaining alternative of potential development is to look eastwards towards the South East Asian region.

Despite having periodic irritants and economic disruptions such as occasional terrorist or militant attacks, as in the case of the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, the threat level remains well contained and pose no danger of regime change to SEA state governments. Moreover, such attacks are usually restricted to only localised areas, such as Mindanao Province in the Philippines, Aceh Province in Indonesia, and the southern border region in Thailand and Malaysia. South East Asian (SEA) state governments also take an active interest in combating terrorism as well as welcoming foreign expertise in augmenting their own local work forces.

In contrast to the Middle East, the economies of SEA countries have also been progressing by leaps and bounds. SEA countries remain an attractive option for India in seeking greener pastures overseas.

Response of South East Asia and how it regards India

In a speech made at Harvard University, Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha pointed out that formerly, India’s engagement with SEA was based on an idealistic perception of Asian brotherhood, a shared colonial history and cultural ties.[8]

However, modern regional dynamics dictate that the progress of SEA is also motivated just as much by trade, investment and production.

The truth is that Asia’s other large regional player, China, has much better pre-set conditions conducive for economic investments and developments attractive to SEA investors. This includes a larger, educated work force in quantitative terms, cheaper material resources in abundance and a relatively stable governance free from any significant external or internal security threat. The simple fact of consumer behaviour gravitating towards a better choice in terms of cost and quality ensures that SEA turns first to China for trade and investment rather than other countries.

However, one major weakness exists for China. Its long history of socialist rule results in a tightly controlled state with little room for political maneuvering or reform. This meant that China is a state that plays by its own rules and is not answerable to non-state players like foreign investors. Foreign investors must adapt to local conditions instead of expecting adherence to international law and trade conduct.

India, in contrast, having less to offer in tangible terms like manpower costs and resource abundance, however, enjoys the reputation of being a democracy which respects consumer rights and international law governing trade and foreign investments. Also, India’s long standing recognition of English as the official language breaks down language and cultural barriers in trade communications, and in theory, accelerates business procedures. This is the advantage that India’s Look East Policy has over China, and should be exploited to the full to gain an edge.

China has, in truth, a less than savory reputation in its foreign relations with its neighbours with regards in pursuing its own economic interests. It deals from a position of strength with regional partners, and usually ends with the latter having to compromise with a lesser share of the cake. Two clear examples were its past records of the Suzhou Project with Singapore, and the occupation of the Spratly Islands. India, however, starts with a clean slate in terms of economic co-operation with regional partners, putting it in a favourable position to win and maintain trust with its partners.

Thus it is very much up to India’s present leaders how they wish to promote the “Look East” policy and market the virtues and advantages of having bi-lateral economic ties with their nation.

Fear in a growing regional hegemony: the race to project naval power in South East Asian waters

The present status quo, with USA as the recognized unilateral superpower ensures relatively little foreign military activity for both India and China. China’s sole security concerns are the re-taking and political integration of Taiwan with its historical claim as being part of its traditional territory. India’s dispute over the Jammu and Kashmir dictates that much military manpower and resources must be dedicated to this troubled province. Significant ground forces are also currently deployed to guard its twin frontiers against Pakistan and China.

In naval projection of power, once again China is assessed as holding an upper hand. China has been building up its naval capabilities for decades in anticipation of a naval crisis in the Taiwan Straits. It has three fleets – North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet, comprising a total of 888 ships by 2005 that can be easily brought to bear anywhere in the Pacific oceanic region.[9] Aside from its own coastal naval bases, the People’s Liberation Navy also occupies and have naval facilities in several convenient and strategic island bases in SEA waters, such as Hainan Island and the Spratly Islands which may act as springboards to easily dominate and control sea lanes from South East Asia to the coasts of China, should the Chinese leadership chooses to adopt such a policy.

In contrast, India’s navy of 145 ships of various classes is designed to mainly balance against Pakistan’s naval assets.[10] Its awkward proximity of its naval bases on both east and west coasts of the Indian sub-continent meant that attempts to control sea lanes in South East Asia is difficult at best, with the Straits of Malacca making only one possible strategic zone. [11] However, ships may still bypass this narrow sea zone easily on voyages from the Middle East and beyond to South East Asia. In conceiving a strategy for possible Indian naval projection of power, it is necessary that India secures an ally such as Indonesia, Singapore or Australia for assess to naval bases in the region for convenient deployment of naval ships.

Moreover, states in SEA react poorly to other international players interfering in what they view as internal SEA regional politics. For example, the Straits of Malacca waterway, an important SEA sea-lane, is constantly patrolled by a cumbersome arrangement of naval assets from three regional navies – Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Media makes the most of what apparently is an optimistic arrangement without a past precedent – a naval co-operation of three states in the operational sense. But in practice, joint patrolling may give rise to unexpected contingencies and problems as compared to if the sea lane is under direct control of a single powerful entity.


Onus with new leaders

The onus of driving the “Look East Policy” of India, of course, lies in the new generation of India’s leaders, since Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took office in 2004.

Domestic developments, such as an emerging middle class, dictates pragmatism in getting India to play the game of international trade and economics with free market rules. Unlike China, which enjoys a number of economic and military advantages over India in tangible and quantitative terms, India cannot rely on FDIs as a springboard toward achieving a well developed economy thriving on service sectors and tertiary industries. As such, it is necessary it looks to other intangible factors to form a niche for itself to offset the regional competition. Its main advantage over China, its regional rival, lies in its official recognition and use of English , the language of international trade and technology and its relatively clean slate of records in economic co-operation with South East Asia.

Currently, SEA’s attention remains focused on China for potential economic development. Relatively free trade and large-scale investments are still currently taking place, bringing mutual benefits for both investors and China itself. Historical experience, however, has shown that China will eventually wish to take its historical place of dominance in Asia, and also the full control of its economic destiny in the manner of a huge empire-like state. Simultaneously, China will wish to restore bilateral relations with other Asian states in mutually beneficial but unequal trade and economic status just like the historical tributary states in pre-modern times.

Already, China’s open intentions of preventing Taiwan from declaring independence were obviously backed by threats of use of force if necessary. Frequent saber rattling across the Taiwan Straits are putting unnecessary strains on the region’s interstate trade dynamics and causing fluctuations in the regional stock markets.

India’s advantage over China lies in the fact of its abstinence from exhibiting ambitions toward a regional hegemony, making it less threatening to states in the SEA region. Should other nations in SEA discover that, in a future scenario, options of trade and investments with China become unfeasible, countries in SEA naturally will then turn towards the next obvious and available option --- India.

It is thus sensible that India prepares its own local economic infrastructure toward supporting the “Look East Policy” in anticipation for such a potential development in future.

REFERENCES

Books consulted:

Adams, Jad, Whitehead, Phillip, The Dynasty ---- The Nehru-Gandhi Story (England: Penguin Books, 1997)

Alam, Aftab, ed., Pakistan’s Fourth Military Coup (India: Raj Publications, 2001)

Chari, P.R. e.d. India – Towards Millennium (New Delhi: Replika Press Pvt. Ltd, 1998)

Hoffmann, Steven A., India and the China Crisis (United States of America: University of California Press, 1990)

Kamra, Sukeshi, Bearing witness – Partition, independence, End of the Raj (Canada: University of Calgary Press, 2002)

Khilnani, Sunil, The Idea of India (USA: Hmiah Hamilton Ltd., 1999)

Lintner, Bertil, Blood Brothers – Crime, Business and Politics in Asia (Australia: South Wind Production, 2002)

Ludden, David, ed., Reading Subaltern Studies – Critical History, Contested meaning and the Globilisation of South Asia (London: Anthem Press, 2002)

Metcalf, Barbara., Metcalf, Thomas. R., A concise history of India (United Kingdom:Cambridge University Press, 2002)

Mehta, Ved, Rajiv Gandhi and Rama’s Kingdom (United States of America: Yale University Press, 1994)

Raza, Maroof, e.d. Generals and governments in India and Pakistan (India: Har-anand Publications Pte. Ltd., 2001)

Sarda, Har Bilas, Hindu Superiority (India: Gopsus Papers Ltd., 2003)

Shekhar, Chandra, Lt. Gen, Arming the Defence Forces, procurement and production policies (India: Manas Publications, 2004)

Singh.K.R., Navies of South Asia (India: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2002)

Stern, Robert. W., Changing India (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1993)

Watson, Francis, India – A Concise History (United Kingdom: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1974)

Varma, Pavan, K., Being Indian – The truth about why the twenty first century will be India’s (Naida:Saurabh Printers Pvt. Ltd, 2004)


Documents consulted:

India’s “Look East” Policy – Changing the Asian Strategic perspective.

Newspapers / News websites consulted:

The Straits Times, Asia Times Online

[1] ASEAN stands for Association of South East Asian States, with the original members being Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines.

[2] “India’s “Look East” Policy: Changing the Asian Strategic Landscape.” AsiaInt Special Reports p.1.

[3] Information sourced and summarized from “India’s “Look East” Policy: Changing the Asian Strategic Landscape.” AsiaInt Special Reports Avail. at http//www.AsiaInt.com

[4] Pranay Gupte, “Rhetoric of ideology or job creation?” The Straits Times 23/09/04

[5] Ibid.

[6] “India’s rich buying into whole new lifestyle concept.” The Straits Times 24/09/04

[7] “Young, educated , middle class and a call girl.” The Straits Times 28/08/04

[8] Sultan Shahin, “India’s ‘Look East’ policy pays off.” Asia Times Online Avail. at http://www.asiatimesonline.com

[9] “Chinese Warships.” Global Security.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/navy.htm

[10] “Indian Navy” Global Security.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/navy.htm

[11] Analysis based on consulting Singh.K.R., Navies of South Asia (India: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2002)

Manipur's Role in 'Look East' Policy is Significant

By Thingbaijam Dhamen
Kangla Online
August 16, 2008

Manipur must play a significant role in the government of India`s look east policy, said an article on India`s Look East Policy and Manipur contained in "Manipur Today", a journal of the state information and public relations department published on the occasion of the 62th Independence Day.

The article by Dr. A Rajmani Singh, department of commerce, Manipur University, Imphal says that Manipur being situated in the extreme corner of North East India bordering Myanmar on the east, must play a significant role of continental dimensions in government of India`s look east policy.

Since 1995, with opening up of trade with Myanmar, and active participation from the state as well as Central government the expected volume of trade was not achieved, the article said stating that of late India`s look east policy with ASEAN countries and second phase policy is on the pipeline.

With the participation of India in the East Asian Summit and from the level of interaction in the 4th India-ASEAN Summit, both held at Kuala Lumpur from 12-14 December 2005, it is seen that the Look-East policy is being pursued aggressively and has started yielding results on the economic and political fields.

This policy which was primarily directed towards improving relations with ASEAN had now been enlarged to cover other nations of the region such as China, Japan and Korea to facilitate more political and economic integration.

To recall Look-east policy was launched in 1992 just after the end of the cold war, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the start of liberalization, it was a very strategic policy decision taken by the government in the foreign policy.

To quote Prime Minister Manmohan Singh "it was also a strategic shift in India`s vision of the world and India`s place in the evolving global economy".

The policy was given an initial thrust with the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visiting China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Singapore and India becoming a important dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1992.

Since the beginning of this century, India has given a big push to this policy by becoming a summit level partner of ASEAN (2002) and getting involved in some regional initiatives such as the BIMSTEC and the Ganga Mekong Cooperation and now becoming a member of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in December, 2005.

India has extended a number of general and project-specific credit lines to Myanmar in the last few years. A number of agreements and MOUs, including the Tripartite Maritime Agreement between India, Myanmar and Thailand, the Border Trade Agreement and an agreement on Cooperation between Civilian Border Authorities, have been signed.

Indian companies are involved in oil and gas exploration in Myanmar. A feasibility study has been undertaken for a rail link between India and Myanmar.

India had upgraded the 160 km long Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo highway in 2001 and will be maintaining it for the next six years. There is an ongoing project for construction of a trilateral highway from Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand to Bagan in Myanmar, the progress of which is being reviewed regularly by the foreign ministers of the three nations. True to Myanamar`s assurances, it has been launching operations against the Indian rebel groups such as NSCN (K) camping in its soil.

Now under the policy, the proposed 1400 km long projects for connecting India-Myanmar-Thailand Trans Asian Highway have been finalized by the respective governments of India, Myanmar and Thailand.

The Indian government had also given a green signal to extend railway link upto Imphal at the first phase and extend upto Myanmar in second phase to give another dimension to trade relationship with ASEAN countries.

Here, the role of the state government is very important, the writer of the article observed citing that once the proposed Trans-Asian highway and rail link from Delhi to Hanoi is completed, the trade relation between India and south east Asian countries will increase manifold.

"As and when the volume of trade will improve both opportunities and challenges will emerge specially for the people of Manipur in particular and India as a whole," the writer observed.

Since the process is on, the day is not far from now. So Manipur government should discuss the issue thoroughly and find out the challenges and bring up the matter to the government of India if necessary, it suggested.

"To attain this objective a strong will, firm commitment and bold decision making government or so called good governance is the need of the hour," it said.

Our 'Look-East' Policy

By M.S.N. Menon
Source: The Tribune
8 November 2002

Do we belong to the West or the East? I raise this issue once again because it is fundamental to our foreign policy. And for another reason too: because we seem to be uncertain.

We were once part of the West and the East. That was at the time of Ashoka. Then we became part of the West: that was when we were under foreign rule — both under Muslims and then under Europeans. In between, we were part of Asia. South East Asia was called an “extension” of India. And the Chinese called India the “Western heaven”. It was a haven and heaven for all Asians.

We did not call the Asian Relations Conference for nothing. China could not have called it. It was a reflex. It was a call for new linkages.

Nations cannot live in isolation. They must concert with others to promote common policies. Or because they belong to a common religion (OIC, for instance) or common civilisation (European Union). India’s link with Asia is civilisational.

An Indian can feel at home anywhere in Asia. And Asians can feel at home in India. It is easier to build relations on this foundation. With the West, we have no such advantage. There is nothing to build on except democracy — a common factor.

It was history which separated us from our neighbourhood. There is no reason why we should not come together again. These are days of economic associations. But even they have a common cultural background.

No peoples are as close to the Hindus culturally as the Buddhists of the world. There is a natural affinity between the two. Foreign relations are built on such affinities.

But India is not a pure Hindu country. It is a country of multiple identities. Our people do not know its political and cultural implications. We do not know how to govern such a country. This is a serious weakness. India has not set its mind on this problem.

Will Muslims and Christians of India appreciate a policy built on Hindu-Buddhist affinity? What if the Christians want to be closer to the Christians of the world and the Muslims, closer to the Muslims of the world? This is a legitimate question. But it has not been raised, nor has it been answered. We prefer not to raise inconvenient questions. But we are not insensitive to Muslim concerns. For example, our policy towards Israel is built on our concern for Muslim opinion. But this, I say, is totally unacceptable. We do not care for Christian opinion at home while dealing with the Christian world. So, why are we sensitive when it comes to Muslims? A multi-cultural society cannot base its policies on race and religion. It can lead to anarchy. We must go for a foreign policy based on class interest (as in America) or evolve a new policy.

A new policy must be based on what is unique about us. We are unique about our immense diversity.

I consider a multicultural society superior to a monocultural society. Indian Muslims and Christians are thus superior to the Muslims and Christians in the rest of the world. How? Because they learn to be more tolerant and because they are closer to the ideal world citizen. A man brought up in a monocultural society is narrow in outlook, intolerant and unfit as a world citizen.

The Indian Muslims and Christians must, thus, take on the role of leaders of their communities in the world — as vanguards of a new movement. That is how they can make themselves important. They should set new standards. This is how they will win the hearts and minds of the Hindus.

Nonalignment served India as a foreign policy option during the cold war. But today it is not of the same relevance. In any case, it cannot serve India’s interests. These are days of economic associations. And India must be part of a group to be effective. SAARC was such a group. But it has no future. The alternative is to join ASEAN and East Asia. Economists once hailed the “economic miracle” of the region and predicted a “Pacific century.” The “look-East” policy is the result of this line of thinking. It is based on sound logic.

India has already established close relations with Vietnam, and of late with Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Mynmar under the Mekong-Ganga project. This is where the Buddhist angle comes in.

But India is also close to other ASEAN countries. It is true, during the cold war, India was not welcome in ASEAN, being a country close to China and Russia. But times have changed. Today ASEAN countries are not only keen to have India as a member, but also as a leader of the ten.

But why? this calls for a brief analysis. South East Asia is more unstable today than at any time before. Indonesia has emerged as the centre of Islamic terrorism. It has already lost East Timor because it did not know how to win over the Christians. The Philippines is going through a civil war. Malaysia is in a crisis over leadership change. And Thailand has a Prime Minister who is under trial for hiding his wealth. But China is what worries ASEAN countries the most largely because of the conflict with China over the South China sea. And there is a sizeable Chinese minority in almost all countries. Their loyalty is first of all to China.

As against these fears, there are positive factors. China is emerging as the largest Asian market. And it is the most low-cost country in Asia at present. No wonder ASEAN countries look to the Chinese market for their imports, too. India cannot offer them any of these advantages.

China has also offered a free trade area to the South East Asian countries. This is not without calculations. But the economic merits cannot be ignored. It is the political problems which stand in the way. What is more, Japan, America and India cannot be enthusiastic about China’s free trade proposal.

But what is cause for greater concern today is the growing frenzy of Islamic fundamentalism. It can disrupt the unity of the region and bring to naught the ASEAN experiment. It will be a disaster. And it will do no good to the Muslims. In fact, they will come out of it the worst.

Islamic terrorism has the potential to break up Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. It has brought America back to the Philippines in great force. In short, if Islamic terrorism is not contained, the history of South East Asia will take a new course. And what that is going to be, one cannot predict. India has a vital interest in what happens there. Which is why there is increasing naval cooperation between India and America today. It is a kind of guarantee that the ASEAN region will remain stable. Both Singapore and Malaysia are keen on the Indian presence in the region.

The “look-East” policy is thus welcome to the region. But we have another interest: to promote multicultural societies in the region. In this the Muslims of India can play a crucial role.

‘Look East' Policy And Manipur

By Anand Oinam

There are many words and phrases in our midst still now which had descended from one lip to another lip for many generations. We cannot trace the authorities who first use the words as a prophecy for the future but it is a fact that there are words which prophesy the future events and happenings.

Fortune tellers or soothsayers in the days of our ancient forefathers had invented and invested words and phrases with a certain mystery. Speak in a cryptic enigmatic language; they were kept for us in the form of riddles to be unfolded and known to us only when the situation or happening equivalent to those as predicted in the riddles had happened before us.

Let me pick up some of the riddles put by our prophet forefathers, the meaning of which is unfolded to our age now. 'Cotton will sink, pebbles will float' (Lashing Luplani, Nung Taorani). The riddle is now decipher in our generation as we haven't seen any raw cotton plant growing in Manipur but we have stone, pebbles at our every step. 'Orphans will cry on tree tops' (Lamja Sharana Uton Watonda Kaplarany). Now we have mikes and loudspeakers. 'Rafts will float on dry lane' (Kangphalda Ungam Taorani), now we have four wheelers in every road. There are many more which are yet to be unfolded. It is amazing that our forefathers had the ability to look into the 'seeds of time and say which grain will grow and which will not'.

Another saying which is worth to be mentioned here is that 'there will be a clash of three groups' (Tengol Ahum) and one prince charming from the east riding on a white horse with a white flag will come and pacify the clash and the door of the East will be opened and that of the west will be shut. Many in our own age try to unfold the meaning of this saying with the ongoing liberation movement of the armed militants, the liberation struggle, the bloodshed and the intervention of the UN coming with a caravan of white wagons and white flags.

Let the riddles of our forefathers remain as riddles. But one thing is evident, the door of the East begins to open, India has modified her external policy especially in the policy of the East neighbor. India begins to focus her interest on the east politically and economically which will ultimately lead to the opening of the door to the east to the advantage of the North-Eastern States particularly Manipur.

Africa has been no longer a dark continent; the exploration of this continent has already been completed in the previous centuries. In the Middle East and Central Asia, there is still hegemony and influence of the US. So for a developing country like India, in order to expand her influence in the world, it is natural to look at the neighboring South-East Asian countries for its base. The Look East policy will serve India in two ways. First, India can extend her network of influence economically and at the same time able to counter the expansion of Chinese influence and market in the region.

For this, one of the ingredient parts in the Look East policy of India is to improve the bilateral relations with China, while remaining a competitor in the expansion of its economic interest in the rest of the South East Asian countries.

Prime Minister AB Vajpayee's presence in the ASEAN summit in October last can be viewed as a step towards this end. During this visit the agreement like Comprehensive Economic Co-operation leading to the creation of Free-Trade Area in 10 yrs have been signed. The PM's meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao in the summit is a major gain for India because after this meeting China recognized Sikkim as a part of India and renewed trade relationship between the two countries even through this State as transit point.

In the case of immediate neighbor Burma, the recent 4 days visit of the Vice-President of India made the ties of the two countries closer. Though ruled by the same colonial power during their pre-independence periods and though the religious and cultural practices are almost akin to each other, the relation between these two neighboring countries is bleak. They are neither allies nor enemies for a long time mainly because of the differences in the system of governance.

But inspite of the different forms of Government in these countries, the developments during the past 10 or more years show that the two are now in a closer tie. In February 2001, the then Union External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh had inaugurated the Tamu-Kalwa Highway, the 22 km road constructed with a 2.20 crore dollars assistance from India. This Highway is a part of the Trans Asian International Highway which will pass through Moreh in Manipur, India.

During the recent visit of the vice-president of India, an agreement to lay the railway line between Yangon and Mandalay with the assistance of 5.7 crore dollars from India had also been signed. Above this there is also a project of Trans Asian railway network connecting Calcutta and Hanoi which will likely run through Manipur.

Looking from all these angles, Manipur will be no longer a landlocked State in the 21st century. Our sons and grandsons will be easier to visit our long lost brothers and sisters in Myanmar in the coming decades. There will be a huge leap in the Indo-Myanmar trade and the whole valley of Manipur will be used as storehouse or transit go-downs for the goods to be transported from the mainland of India to the East Asian countries and vice versa and many Manipuris can become brothers in the transaction. Above this there is a huge demand of technical expertise and experts in many other fields in our neighbor of the East and our talented youngsters can be exported there and there will be no unemployment in the State then.

For this lots are to be done and to be prepared by the Union and State Governments. First to encourage better trade relations in the existing trade agreement, there must be smooth flow of transaction on the legalized items. The type of hiccup put by the detention of trucks carrying legitimate items in Bihar should not be there in the flow of trade in future. There must not be undue tax collections from all quarters in the high ways.

There must be peace and development at the most. There is a hearsay in Manipur that there has not been any progress, it finds insurgency and because of insurgency non-investments are coming leading to non-development. So it is like a vicious cycle, somewhere we should have to break it. With the opening of the gate of the East there may be another 'Gold rush' to Manipur from the foreign investor, who knows? It is time for us to prepare and to face the opportunity and the challenges to come. Let this writer not be taken as a man living in an 'Utopia of fools' by those who happen to read this piece after a hundred year or so.

Courtesy: The Sangai Express

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Sunday, September 28, 2008

Look East Policy

India's 'Look East' Policy represents its efforts to cultivate extensive economic and strategic relations with the nations of Southeast Asia in order to bolster its standing as a regional power and a counterweight to the strategic influence of the People's Republic of China.
Contents
1 Background
2 Relations with East Asian nations
3 Relations with China
4 Participation in organisations
5 Assessment
Background
Ever since the Chinese invasion of Tibet and Sino-Indian War of 1962, China and India have been strategic competitors in South and East Asia. China has cultivated close commercial and military relations with India's neighbour and rival Pakistan and competed for influence in Nepal and Bangladesh. After Deng Xiaoping's rise to power in China in 1979, China began reducing threats of expansionsism and in turn cultivated extensive trade and economic relations with Asian nations. China became the closest partner and supporter of the military junta of Burma (also Union of Myanmar), which had been ostracised from the international community following the violent suppression of pro-democracy activities in 1988.

India's "Look East" policy was developed and enacted during the governments of Prime Ministers of P.V. Narasimha Rao (1991 - 1996) and Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998 - 2004). Along with economic liberalisation and moving away from Cold War-era policies and activities, India's strategy has focused on forging close economic and commercial ties, increasing strategic and security cooperation and the emphasis of historic cultural and ideological links. India sought to create and expand regional markets for trade, investments and industrial development. It also began strategic and military cooperation with nations concerned by the expansion of China's economic and strategic influence.

Relations with East Asian nations
Although it had traditionally supported Burma's pro-democracy movement for many years, India's policy changed in 1993, making friendly overtures to the military junta. India signed trade agreements and increased its investments in Burma; although private sector activity remains low, India's state corporations have landed lucrative contracts for industrial projects and the construction of major roads and highways, pipelines and upgrading of ports. India has also increased its competition with China over the harnessing of Burma's significant oil and natural gas reserves, seeking to establish a major and stable source of energy for its growing domestic needs, countering Chinese monopoly over Burmese resources and reducing dependence on oil-rich Middle Eastern nations. Although China remains Burma's largest military supplier, India has offered to train Burma's military personnel and has sought their cooperation in curbing separatist militants and the heavy drug trafficking affecting much of Northeast India. China's winning of contracts harnessing more than 2.88-3.56 trillion cubits of natural gas in the A-1 Shwe field in the Rakhine State and development of naval and surveillance installations along Burma's coast and the Coco Islands has provoked great concern and anxiety in India, which has stepped up its investment in port development, energy, transport and military sectors.
India has also established strong commercial, cultural and military ties with the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Cambodia. India signed free trade agreements with Sri Lanka and Thailand and stepped up its military cooperation with them as well. It has forged numerous free trade agreements with East Asian economies, including a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement with Singapore and an Early Harvest Scheme with Thailand, while it is negotiating agreements with Japan, South Korea, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. Ties have been strengthened with Taiwan, Japan and South Korea over common emphasis on democracy, human rights and strategic interests. South Korea and Japan remain amongst the major sources of foreign investment in India.

While India has remained a staunch supporter of the "One China" policy and recognised the People's Republic of China on the mainland over the Republic of China authorities on Taiwan, it has, nevertheless, pursued a policy of increasing engagement with the island. India has stepped up engagement with East Asia fueled by its need for cooperation on counter-terrorism, humanitarian relief, anti-piracy, maritime and energy security, confidence-building and balancing the influence of other powers, notably China. Driven by the fact that more than 50% of India's trade passes through the Malacca Strait, the Indian navy has established a Far Eastern Naval Command off Port Blair on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India has also been conducting joint naval exercises with Singapore (SIMBEX) since 1993, with Vietnam in 2000 and has engaged in joint patrols with Indonesia in the Andaman Sea since 2002. Japan and India were also members of the tsunami relief regional core group in the Indian Ocean in 2004 along with Australia and the United States.

Relations with China

While India and China remain strategic rivals, India's "Look East" policy has included significant rapprochement with China. Since 1993, India began holding high-level talks with Chinese leaders and established Confidence-building measures. In 2006, China and India opened the Nathu La Pass for cross-border trade for the first time since the 1962 war. On November 21, 2006 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a 10-point joint declaration to improve ties and resolve long-standing conflicts. Trade between China and India increases by 50% each year, and is set to reach the $60 billion target set for 2010 by both Indian and Chinese governments and industrial leaders. However, China's close relations with Pakistan and border disputes in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh have threatened the improvement in bilateral relations. India's support for the exiled Tibetan religious leader, the Dalai Lama also causes some friction in bilateral ties.

Participation in organisations
India has developed multilateral organisations such as the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation and BIMSTEC, forging extensive cooperation on environmental, economic development, security and strategic affairs, permitting the growth of influence beyond South Asia and without the tense and obstructive presence of Pakistan and China that has stalled its efforts in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. India became a sectoral dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1992, a full dialogue partner in 1995, a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996, and a summit level partner (on par with China, Japan and Korea) in 2002. The first India-ASEAN Business Summit was held in New Delhi in 2002. India also acceded to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003.
In many cases, India's membership to these forums has been a result of attempts by the region to balance China's growing influence in the area. Notably, Japan brought India into ASEAN+6 to dilute the ASEAN+3 process, where China is dominant, while Singapore and Indonesia played a significant role in bringing India into the East Asia Summit. The United States and Japan have also lobbied for India's membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Numerous infrastructure projects also serve to tie India closer to East Asia. India is participating in the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific initiatives for an Asian Highway Network and the Trans-Asian Railway Network. Discussions are also proceeding on reopening the World War II-era Stilwell Road linking India's Assam state with China's Yunnan province through Myanmar.

Assessment

Commerce with South and East Asian nations accounts for almost 45% of India's foreign trade. Although its efforts have met with considerable success, India trails China in the volume of trade and economic ties it enjoys with the nations of the region. India's cultivation of friendly relations with the military regime of Burma and its reluctance to criticise or pressure it over human rights violations and suppression of democracy has evoked much criticism at home and abroad, though its in the country's national interest to do so.
Source: Wikipedia

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